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I. INTRODUCTION 
An attorney convicted of a serious crime involving moral turpitude may 
be consequently disciplined for violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) of the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility1 or Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules ·of 
Professional Conduct2 without the need for relitigating the issue of the at-
torney's criminal guilt. Likewise, when an attorney is disbarred in one ju-
, risdiction, he can be disbarred by another jurisdiction without relitigating 
the underlying facts which were the basis for the initial disbarment. When 
courts thus discipline lawyers, they are invoking collateral estoppel to pre-
vent the attorney from relitigating an issue raised and resolved against him 
in a prior action even if the tribunal or cause of action is not the same. 
However, these same disciplinary courts have refused to invoke collateral 
estoppel to preclude relitigation of a finding of fraudulent conduct by an 
attorney who violated an SEC regulation by preparing a prospectus con-
taining false information, or who prepared a Patent Office application con-
taining a false assertion of the date of a relevant document or who drafted 
a will provision improperly naming the attorney and/or his partner as exec-
utor, or who was found to have made fraudulent misrepresentations in a 
contract matter. A few courts, however, have indicated their intent to do 
so. 
The policy of withholding preclusive effect from civil findings in a subse-
quent disciplinary action grants an attorney an opportunity to relitigate is-
sues previously examined and decided adversely to the attorney. This spe-
cial privilege exempts attorneys from processes applicable to laymen and 
other professionals and conflicts with the judicial goals of finality, effi-
ciency, consistency, and fairness sought to be effectuated through invoca-
tion of collateral estoppel. 3 
In this article, we examine the propriety of invoking collateral estoppel 
in disciplinary cases based on prior civil proceedings and the relevant case 
law which, with two exceptions, rejects such invocation. We dissent from 
the majority view and propose uniform treatment of prior civil findings, 
I. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR l-102(A)(5) (1980) [hereinafter MODEL 
CODE). 
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES). 
3. See Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455, 482 N.E.2d 63, 67, 492 N .Y.S.2d 584, 588 
(1985) ("(Issue preclusion is] intended to reduce litigation and conserve the resources of the court and 
litigants and it is based upon the general notion that it is not fair to permit a party to relitigate an issue 
that has already been decided against it."); Pielemeier, Due Process Limitations on the Application of 
Collateral Estoppe/ Against Nonparties to Prior Litigation, 63 B.U.L. REV. 383, 394 ( 1983) (noting 
the benefits yielded by an expansion of collateral estoppel: reducing the number of lawsuits arid relitiga-
tion of issues; more efficient expenditure of judicial resources; reducing the delay in trials of other 
· lawsuits; easing the burden placed on litigants and witnesses; and promoting consistency, finality, and 
greater public confidence in the courts). 
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allowing their use in administrative disciplinary hearings4 to estop attor-
neys from contesting prior adverse determinations. 
Under our proposal, the findings in a prior civil action could be asserted 
to preclude an attorney from contesting disciplinary violations constituted 
by those findings, provided that the civil findings satisfied the traditional 
elements of collateral estoppel normally required by the jurisdiction.5 The 
disciplinary committee would carry the burden of proving identity of issue 
while the attorney wouid carry the burden of showing that the prior pro-
ceeding's findings are inappropriate for estoppel effect.6 
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Collateral estoppeF prevents a party to a prior action from relitigating in 
4. Though disciplinary mechanisms vary from state to state, many states use a system similar to that 
proposed by the ABA's Model Standards for Disciplinary Enforcement. See Standards For Lawyer 
Discipline and Disability Proceedings (1979), in PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 
67 (1979) . Typically, an informal administrative investigation is conducted first, to determine whether 
the inquiry warrants dismissal or disposal with a nondisciplinary admonition. If there is reason to be-
lieve that attorney has engaged in professional misconduct, the matter is referred for investigation and, 
if necessary, plenary hearing. This hearing is generally presided over by an administrative panel, reserv-
ing to the lawyer the right to a review hearing and a final right to review on the record in an appellate 
court. See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS§ 3.4.1, at 99 (1986). Cf N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, §§ 605 .1 - 605 .24 ( I 988) (Rules and Procedures of the Departmental Disciplinary Com-
mittee). For a more extensive description pointing out state distinctions, see Dorf, Disbarment in The 
United States: Who Shall Do the Noisome Work?, 12 COLUM. J .L. & Soc. PRoes. , I, 43-71 (1975). 
Under the proposition endorsed in this article, once the disciplinary authority satisfies its burden of 
proving that the adverse finding in the prior civil proceeding addressed the identical issue at question in 
the disciplinary hearing, the hearing is reduced to a determination of sanction with regard to the viola-
tion based on the prior finding . An analogous process would be a tort case where the defendant is 
estopped from contesting liability and the trial is merely to determine damages. See Goldstein v. Con-
solidated Edison Co., 93 A.D.2d 589, 462 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1983) (defendant estopped from contesting 
prior suit's finding of gross negligence though plaintiffs were not parties to that action), aff d, 62 
N .Y.2d 936,468 N.E.2d 51,479 N .Y.S.2d 213 (1984) , cert . denied, 469 U.S. 1210 (1985) . 
5. Thus, if the jurisdiction still requires mutuality of estoppel for offensive collateral estoppel, offen-
sive preclusion could not be used in a disciplinary hearing. This proposal advocates only that the proce-
dure with respect to attorneys be the same as for others, though it notes mutuality is not a reasonable 
ground for rejecting the application of collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters. See infra text accom-
panying notes 57-63 . 
6. " [T]he burden rests on the [common party] to show that collateral estoppel should not be applied 
because he did not have a full and fair opportunity . . . just as the burden of showing that the issue 
was identical and necessarily decided rests upon the moving party." Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 24 
N.Y.2d 65, 73,246 N .E.2d 725,730,298 N .Y.S .2d 955,962 (1969) . 
7. Collateral estoppel, a component of the rules of former adjudication, governs the preclusive effect 
a second tribunal gives issue determinations of prior adjudications. Note, Collateral Estoppel Effects of 
Administrative Agency Determinations: Where Should Federal Courts Draw The Line?, 73 CORNELL 
L. REV . 817, 819-20 (1988) . Additional labels for the doctrine include "estoppel by judgment," see J. 
FRIEDENTHAL, M . KANE & A. MILLER. CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.1, at 607 (1985) [hereinafter 
FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER], "estoppel by verdict", see Best Coin-Op, Inc. V. Paul F. Ilg Supply 
Co., 189 Ill. App. 3d 638, .545 N.E.2d 481, 496 (1989), and "issue preclusion," see RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27 (1982); Vestal , Res Judicata/Prer/usion: Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV . 
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a subsequent action an issue raised and resolved against that party even if 
the tribunal or cause of action is not the same.8 With the steady abandon-
ment of the requirement of mutuality9 and the embrace of nonparty off en-
357, 359 (1974). 
8. See Buckingham v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 398 N .W.2d 873 (Iowa 1987) (holding son and 
daughter-in-law's subsequent suit against bank, dependent on same issues as previous unsuccessful ac-
tion against mother's estate, barred by collateral estoppel effect of the first court's finding); Colucci v. 
Thomas Nicol Asphalt Co., 194 N .J . Super. 510, 477 A.2d 403 (1984) (allowing prior litigation by 
passenger against two drivers in which driver one was found sixty percent responsible for auto accident, 
to be used to collaterally estop driver one's suit seeking affirmative relief from driver two). In Ryan v. 
New York Telephone Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984), overruled by 
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 623(2) (McKinney 1988), the Department of Labor, in an administrative hearing to 
determine eligibility for unemployment benefits, found that an employee had removed company prop-
erty without authorization and was thus discharged for cause. The employee brought civil charges 
against employer for slander and wrongful discharge. The administrative law judge's findings were 
given collateral estoppel effect and precluded the employee from prosecuting the action against the 
employer. See also Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Iowa 1981) ("[I]ssue preclu-
sion prevents parties to a prior action in which judgment has been entered from relitigating in a subse-
quent action issues raised and resolved in the previous action.") (footnote omitted); Ryan v. Progressive 
Casualty Ins. Co., 414 N.W.2d 470,472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) ("A determination of an issue in a suit 
is conclusive of the issue in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to a 
prior litigation"). 
Historically, the application of collateral estoppel required that four conditions be satisfied: I) the 
issue litigated in the prior adjudication must be identical with the issue now in question; 2) the prior 
determination was necessary to the prior judgment and is decisive in the present action; 3) the prior 
action offered a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and 4) the parties in the subsequent 
action were parties or are in privily with parties to the previous litigation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
Of JUDGMENTS §§ 27-29 (1982). Today, the fourth requirement, mutuality, has been discarded in many 
instances. Se'ir'tnfra note 9. 
9. Under the rule of mutuality only parties to an action or their privies can be bound by or take 
advantage of a prior determination. See 18 C. WRIGHT. A MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE§ 4463, at 559 (1981) ("[T]he favorable preclusion effects of a judgment [are] availa-
ble only to a person who would have been bound by any unfavorable preclusion effects."); 5 J. WEIN· 
STEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK C1v1L PRACTICE 11 5011.38, at 50-209 (1985) (Under 
"[m]utuality of estoppel ... a party [is] not permitted to take advantage of the result in a prior action 
unless he could meet the same standards of participation or privily as a party who was bound by the 
judgment in that action.") . Thus, a requirement of mutuality often allowed a party who had litigated 
and lost in a previous action to litigate identical issues again with new parties. Kuehn v. Garcia, 608 
F.2d 1143, 1147 (8th Cir. I 979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 943 (1980). In order to curb the inefficiency in 
relitigation, see Pielemeier, supra note 3, at 394-95 (noting the efficiencies sought through the use of 
preclusion), courts have steadily limited or banished the rule. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 
Inc. v. University of Ill . Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971) (permitting patent defendant to use 
prior finding that patent was invalid though mutuality between the parties did not exist); Schwartz v. 
Public Adm'r, 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E.2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969) (passenger's separate, suc-
cessful negligence suits against drivers involved in accident given collateral estoppel effect in subsequent 
suit between drivers); Hanson v. Oregon Dep't of Revenue, 294 Or. 23, 32, 653 P.2d 964, 968 (1982) 
(en bane) (ruling United States Tax Court's previous decision that trust was invalid precluded taxpay-
ers from relitigating same issue in analogous suit brought by state tax authorities) . The decision tradi-
tionally credited with initiating this movement is Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savs. 
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942) (Traynor, J.) (in administrix's lawsuit to recover allegedly 
unauthorized withdrawals, defendant bank permitted to assert, preclusively, probate court's earlier de-
termination that withdrawal was valid gift). Some states, though, have retained mutuality in certain 
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sive collateral estoppel, 10 the use of issue preclusion has grown 
substantially. 
Ill. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS 
In disciplinary proceedings, courts have limited the use of issue preclu-
sion to determinations arising out of criminal proceedings 11 and the disci-
plinary proceedings of foreign jurisdictions. 12 
A. DISCIPLINE BASED ON CRIMINAL CONVICTION INVOLVING MORAL 
TURPITUDE 
"A lawyer is subject to discipline under the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, for criminal conduct involving moral turpitude, and, 
under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for criminal con-
duct reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness 
to practice." 13 
In a disciplinary hearing, a lawyer's prior criminal conviction serves as 
conclusive proof of the facts of the crime. These facts may not be reliti-
gated in the disciplinary hearing. 14 Moreover, because a criminal conviction 
circumstances. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217 
(1980) (maintaining requirement of mutuality where offensive collateral estoppel is sought in one of a 
series of suits arising from a common disaster). See generally Annotation, Mutuality of Estoppe/ as 
Prerequisite of Availability of Doctrine of Collateral Estoppe/ to a Stranger to the' Judgment, 31 
A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). 
I 0. Non party offensive collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff, not a party to a previous proceed-
ing, litigates with a defendant who has lost on the identical issue in the previous adjudication and the 
defendant is precluded from relitigating the prior adverse determination. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery 
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 ( 1979) (precluding corporation, in subsequent shareholder suit, from con-
testing findings of false and misleading proxy statement arising out of prior SEC suit); Goldstein v. 
Consolidated Edison Co., 93 A.D.2d 589, 462 N.Y.S.2d 646 (1st Dep't 1983) (estopping defendant 
from contesting prior suit's finding of gross negligence though plaintiffs were not parties to prior ac-
tion), ajjd, 62 N.Y.2d 936, 468 N.E.2d 51,479 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1210 
( 1985). 
I I. See In re Scott, 98 Ill. 2d 9, 16,455 N.E.2d 81, 84 (1983) (attorney's federal conviction of filing 
false income tax returns is conclusive of his guilt in disciplinary proceeding); In re Frick, 694 S.W.2d 
473, 477-78 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) (attorney at disciplinary hearing estopped from challenging underly-
ing facts of prior criminal conviction); In re Lowell, 88 A.D.2d 128, 452 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1982) (re-
jecting proffered evidence as casting doubt upon respondent's guilt rather than reflecting upon the im-
portance of the criminal conviction). 
12. See In re Witte, 99 Ill. 2d 301, 310-11, 458 N.E.2d 484, 488 (1983) (prior Missouri disciplinary 
hearing put the facts beyond dispute in reciprocal Illinois action); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I I0A, para. 763 
(Smith-Hurd 1985) 1 (Reciprocal Disciplinary Matters); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 
1022.22 (1988). (attorney may be heard in mitigation but, absent procedural infirmity or manifest in-
justice, attorney may not contest the foreign jurisdiction findings). Foreign jurisdiction refers to another 
state, territory, or district. 
13. Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 101:301 (Feb. 28, 1990) [hereinafter Law. Man.). 
14. C. WOLFRAM. supra note 4, § 3.3.2, at 90-91. 
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requjres a beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, the proof will al-
ways meet the standard of proof required in a disciplinary hearing. 
The convicted lawyer is permitted, however, to present evidence in miti-
gation of the seriousness of the crime or his own culpability. While he can-
not contest the commission of the acts of which he was convicted, he can 
argue for a lesser sanction. The value of this opportunity is limited in situa-
tions where the jurisdiction mandates disbarment for the crime 
committed. 15 
B. DISCIPLINE BASED ON DISCIPLINE IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION 
In general, states have court rules governing reciprocal discipline 16 which 
prescribe application of collateral estoppel to foreign disciplinary decrees. 17 
A typical rule reads: 
The certified or authenticated copy of the findings of fact in [a] discipli-
nary proceeding in .. . [an]other jurisdiction shall constitute conclusive 
evidence that the attorney in question committed the unprofessional con-
duct, and the only issue before the Board and the Supreme Court shall be 
whether there is any reason for not imposing the same discipline . . . that 
was imposed in the other jurisdiction. 18 
This treatment of foreign disciplinary determinations is analogous to the 
use by federal courts of state court findings when presiding over matters of 
exclusive federal jurisdiction. 19 The foreign jurisdiction's findings of fact 
are conclusive while the consequences of those determinations may be con-
tested by the attorney. 
Beyond these applications of collateral estoppel, courts have rejected or 
15. E.g., N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90.4.a (McKinney 1983) (mandating disbarment upon conviction of a 
felony) . 
16. A reciprocal discipline rule allows "discipline imposed in another jurisdiction [to) form the basis 
for local discipline : . . . Under it, the second court reserves the prerogative, very rarely exercised, of 
rejecting the first state's findings if the lawyer can satisfactorily demonstrate that the original findings 
were seriously defective." C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 3.4.6, at 116 (footnotes omitted) . 
17. See, e.g., N .Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.3 (1988). Cf Cummings v. Virginia State 
Bar, 233 Va. 363, 367, 355 S.E.2d 588, 590-91 (1987) ("[P]rinciples of collateral estoppel .. . [do 
not] govern a domestic proceeding based upon a foreign disbarment. Rather, such proceedings in Vir-
ginia are governed by rules of this Court . . . . ") (citations omitted) . Despite the court's disavowal of 
collateral estoppel, the rules of the court, in fact, codify the collateral estoppel doctrine. The relevant 
rule "does not permit the respondent attorney to relitigate any issues of fact which were expressly or 
implicitly decided in the foreign jurisdiction [absent procedural infirmity or unfairnes~.)" Id. at 36, 355 
S.E.2d at 591 . 
18. UTAH CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. ch. 14 R . XVII (Disciplinary Proceedings Based on Discipline 
Imposed in Another Jurisdiction), reprinted in UTAH COURT RULES ANN. 1083 (Michie I 991 ). Illinois 
has an equivalent rule granting preclusive effect to the findings of foreign disciplinary proceedings. See 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l lOA, para. 763 (Smith-Hurd 1985). 
19. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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refrained from using findings of civil tribunals to estop attorneys from con-
testing the adverse findings of those tribunals in subsequent disciplinary 
matters. 
IV. DECISIONS REJECTING COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: ARGUMENT AND 
COUNTERARGUMENT 
Few reported cases address the issue of granting preclusive effect to prior 
civil tribunals' factual determinations in subsequent disciplinary hearings.20 
Most cases that do address the issue reject the notion,21 citing as reasons 
20. That many disciplinary findings are not publicly reported exacerbates the difficulty of marshal-
ling information on this specific topic. For example, In re Cohn, No. M-5696 (N .Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 
July 20, 1983), discussed infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text, was deemed confidential when 
handed down and therefore not published. See N.Y. Juo. LAW § 90.10 (McKinney 1983). Though the 
Cohn opinion is no longer confidential and the ensuing disbarment has been made public, see In re 
Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15,503 N.Y.S.2d 759, appeal denied and stay denied, 68 N.Y.2d 712,497 N.E.2d 
698, 506 N.Y.S.2d 331 (I 986), the appellate division collateral estoppel opinion remains unreported. 
21. See In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390, 532 N.E.2d 248 (1988) (refusing to give collateral estoppel 
effect in disciplinary proceeding to factual findings arising out of a civil fraud action); In re Tanz, 233 
A.D. 300, 252 N.Y.S. 769 (1931) (precedential value significantly limited by subsequent ruling, In re 
Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 17 (allowing the use of collateral estoppel in disciplinary proceeding as 
to the truth or untruth of the charges)); In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 (Utah 1980). Yet another case, 
State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W.2d 474 (1944), re-
jected an assertion that a prior civil action was conclusive in the disciplinary proceeding, noting that the 
prior civil action had only required a preponderance of the evidence while disciplinary procedures call 
for a clear and convincing standard of evidence. The court then went on to announce: 
It is therefore the holding of this court that the finding in a civil action that an attorney at 
law has been guilty of conduct justifying disbarment is not conclusive on the same question 
when presented for determination in an action for disbarment; that notwithstanding the find-
ing in a civil action the culpability of the attorney must be established in the disbarment 
action by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. at 328-29, 16 N.W.2d at 476. Subsequent Nebraska case law has failed to indicate whether 
Gudmundsen stands for the proposition that no civil determinations will be conclusive in disciplinary 
proceedings or, only findings proved by only a preponderance of the evidence will not be accepted as 
binding in disciplinary proceedings. 
Other courts, while deciding whether the record from a previous civil proceeding may be offered 
merely as pro)>ative evidence (rather than conclusive evidence) in a subsequent disciplinary hearing, 
have, in dicta, rejected the preclusivc effect of civil determinations. See In re Wright, 10 Cal. 3d 374, 
377, 515 P.2d 292, 293, 110 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349 (1973) ("The findings in the civil [fraud] action arc 
not binding upon this court in this proceeding . ... We exercise an independent judgment on the facts 
.. .. "); In re Santusuosso, 318 Mass. 489, 493, 62 N .E.2d 105, 107-08 (1945) (court will not grant 
civil judgment same preclusivc effect granted another jurisdiction's judgment of disbarment); Levi v. 
Mississippi State Bar, 436 So. 2d 781, 787 n.l (Miss. 1983) ("[T)hc Bar makes no collateral cstoppel 
argument, which of course would be inconsistent with this Court's peculiar role as fact finder in bar 
disciplinary matters."). But cf In re Application of Persky, 92 A.D.2d 372, 374, 460 N.Y.S.2d 316, 
318 (Hearing Panel of the Committee on Grievances found against a practitioner "only on the charges 
it believed it was precluded from considering de novo because of collateral cstoppel".), reh'g denied, 94 
A.D.2d 23, 462 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1983). The Persky case decides an application for reinstatement as an 
attorney and docs not examine the collateral estoppel issue. Rather, it recounts the respondent's disci-
plinary history which included an instance of a hearing panel of the Committee on Grievances allowing 
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exclusive regulatory authority,22 mutuality,23 foreseeability,24 and disparate 
burdens of proof between proceedings. 25 
A. EXCLUSIVE REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
The primary justification offered for withholding collateral estoppel ef-
fect from civil findings in the disciplinary context is that giving such effect 
to the findings of a civil court would constitute an illegal delegation and 
abridgment of a high court's power to regulate the discipline of attorneys. 
By emphasizing their role as the disciplinary arbiter within the bar,26 
courts seek to portray the adoption of other courts' civil findings as an ab-
dication of that role.27 
Generally, the highest court28 of each state has arrogated to itself the 
exclusive power to regulate the practice of law, finding that power inherent 
in the tripartite form of government that prevails in most states. 29 Arising 
civil findings to be used preclusively in a disciplinary proceeding. The proceeding resulted only in a 
reprimand which the respondent did not appeal. The Committee on Grievances had no right of appeal. 
Without any appeal, the matter never came before a court. Thus, this use of collateral estoppel was 
without judicial approbation. For an extended discussion of the matters giving rise to Persky's discipli-
nary proceedings, see K. EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF FINLEY KuM-
BLE, ONE OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAW FIRMS 35-47 (1990) . 
22. See infra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. 
23. See In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d at 398, 532 N.E.2d at 251. 
24. Id. at 399, 532 N.E.2d at 252. 
25. Id. at 400, 532 N.E.2d at 252; In re Gygi, 273 Or. 443, 448, 541 P.2d 1392, 1395 (1975) . 
26. Courts arc vigilant in the protection of the power to discipline attorneys. Cf United States v. 
Vague, 697 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's sua sponte order that criminal 
defendant's attorney return part of a legal fee because the fee was excessive). The circuit court felt the 
district court had sought to exercise disciplinary power properly reserved to disciplinary authorities 
within the bar. For a critique of Vague, see Brickman, A Massachusetts Debacle: Gagnon v. Shablom, 
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417, 1422 n.36 (1991). See also Silverberg v. Schwartz, 75 A.D.2d 817, 819, 
427 N. Y .S.2d 480, 482 ( I 980) (staying arbitration of sections of a partnership agreement held to be 
restrictions on the practice of a lawyer in violation of DR 2-107 and DR 2-108 because "public policy 
requires that violations of the rules of professional conduct not be subject to negotiation and arbitration, 
but that such violations come before the scrutiny of the courts"); Dorf, supra note 4, at I (1975) 
("Among the legal profession's most jealously guarded rights has been the ability to discipline its mem-
bers .. .. ") (footnote omitted). 
27. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
28. Typically, only a state's highest court may suspend or disbar a lawyer. Law. Man. , supra note 
13, at 101 :2003. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, at§ 2.2.4. But, in New York, the appellate divisions, 
intermediate appellate courts, exercise the power to discipline attorneys, see, e.g., In re Keenan, I 50 
A.D.2d 1, 545 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1989) (imposing two year suspension). See also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90.2 
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990), and the power to promulgate rules of conduct, see Gair v. Peck, 6 
N.Y.2d 97, 115, 160 N.E.2d 43, 53, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491, 504-05 (upholding appellate division's power to 
promulgate fee schedule under that court's statutory power to prescribe rules of professional conduct), 
modified, 6 N .Y.2d 983, 161 N.E.2d 736, 191 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1959), cert. denied and appeal dis-
missed, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). See also N .Y. JuD. LAW § 90.2. 
29. See Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 
12 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L. J . I, 3 ( 1989) (describing the harnessing and manipulation of the inhcr-
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out of this position, each state's supreme court acts as the ultimate discipli-
nary authority within the state. 30 In this role, high courts have traditionally 
reserved for themselves the right to reject the recommenqations of discipli-
nary committees and to make their own findings and impose sanctions of 
their own formulation. 31 
Thus, one court has noted that, since "it is the responsibility of this court 
to determine what conduct is disciplinable and to determine the severity of 
discipline in a particular case,"32 the court is loath to allow fact-finding in 
the disciplinary process to take place outside of formal disciplinary hear-
ings. 33 Even a court not resting its rejection of collateral estoppel on dilu-
tion of its exclusive authority but rather on its interpretation of a statute 
governing disciplinary procedures,34 was, in reality, most concerned with 
maintaining its exclusive authority. By professing deference to the intent of 
the legislature, that court effectively construed the provisions in a way that 
strengthened its position as the sole authority over the disciplinary 
ent-powers doctrine by courts to claim they have the exclusive prerogative of regulating lawyers) . 
"[T]he inherent-powers doctrine [is] a judge-made, lawyer-supported doctrine holding that courts and 
only courts, may regulate the practice of law." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). In New 
York, there is a significant degree of legislative control but it has been delegated to the appellate 
divisions. See N.Y. Juo. LAW § 90. Cf. People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 
(1928); In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). For a brief discussion of these cases, see Brickman, supra 
note 26, at 1417 n.5 . 
30. See In re Mackay, 416 P.2d 823, 829 (Alaska 1964) (state statute imposing upon the Supreme 
Court of Alaska "the mandatory duty of issuing an order in full accordance with the recommendation 
of the Board [of Governors) ... was unconstitutional for being an invasion of the inherent power of 
the court to discipline and disbar members of the Alaska Bar Association"), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 
1003 (1966). Cf. Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 266, 348 N.E.2d 320, 322 (1976) ("[W)ith 
regard to our jurisdiction over the discipline of attorneys[, o]ur authority is exclusive and absolute.") 
(dismissing disciplinary complaint brought by citizen's group directly to state supreme court and seek-
ing to avoid the disciplinary mechanism set up by the supreme court rules) . 
31. See, e.g., In re Crisci, 101 111. 2d 332,335,344,461 N.E.2d 994,995,999 (1984) (hearing panel 
recommends censure; review board recommends dismissal of the complaint; supreme court imposes 
three-year suspension); In re Blackham, 588 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 1978) ("This Court is not bound to 
accept the disciplinary recommendations proposed by the Bar.") (footnote omitted) (bar commission 
recommends two-year suspension; court imposes public censure and reprimand). 
32. In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 400, 532 N.E.2d 248, 252 (1988). Cf. Levi v. Mississippi State 
Bar, 436 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 1983). 
33. In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 400, 532 N.E.2d at 252. See also Smith v. Kates, 46 Ohio St. 2d 263, 
348 N.E.2d 320 (1976) (dismissing citizen's complaint seeking suspension of attorney without comply-
ing with normal disciplinary procedures). 
34. The Utah Supreme Court, in In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 587 (Utah 1980), turned to section 78-
51-18 of the Utah Code as its principal basis for denying the use of preclusion. In relevant part, the 
statute reads: "The board shall make findings and reports to the Supreme Court of the results of its 
hearings and investigations, and conclusions, with recommendations in the premises, and . . . shall 
recommend such disciplinary action . .. as the case shall in its judgment warrant." UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-51-18 (1987). In interpreting the statute, the Court ruled that "[t)o merely adopt the findings of 
some other tribunal would be contrary to the obvious intent of the statute that requires the Board to 
make its own findings based upon an evidentiary hearing." In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 587. 
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process.35 
1. Adopting a Civil Court Finding Does Not Illegally Delegate the Power 
to Discipline Attorneys 
While fact-finding is a necessary part of disciplinary proceedings, the 
primary aspect of the disciplinary process is determining whether certain 
conduct falls below the minimum standard required of attorneys36 and the 
sanction thereby warranted. 37 
Thus, adopting the findings of a civil court from that or another jurisdic-
tion is not a delegation of the power to discipline attorneys. Jt is still the 
disciplinary court or the disciplinary board, operating under the supervision 
of the court, that determines whether the civil finding constitutes lawyer 
misconduct38 or otherwise violates the rules of conduct promulgated by that 
court.39 Moreover, even if the disciplinary court invokes collateral estoppel 
to determine that there has been a violation, the appropriate sanction is 
still decided within the disciplinary framework; respondent attorneys are 
given the opportunity to present mitigating evidence arguing for lesser 
sanctions.40 Finally, if the state supreme court, as ultimate authority on 
attorney discipline,41 does not agree with the recommendations, it has the 
power to reject them and impose sanctions it deems appropriate.42 While 
the courts reject preclusion to avoid "an abridgement of the disciplinary 
3~. For accounts describing the willingness of courts to manipulate the doctrine of inherent powers 
to preserve their sole authority over the practice of law, sec Wolfram, supra note 29, at 14 ("the courts 
in many states have invoked the negative aspect of the [inherent powers] doctrine to outlaw legislation 
that has nothing to do with lawyers functioning in courts") and Alpert, The Inherent Power of the 
Courts to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 525 (1983). 
36. Minimum standards for conduct arc generally stated in the state's version of the ABA Afodel 
Code of Professional Responsibility, see, e.g., THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
(N.Y. App. Div. effective Sept. 1, 1990) [hereinafter LAWYER'S CODE), reprinted in N.Y.L.J., May 14, 
1990, at S-1, col. I (adopting an amended Code of Professional Responsibility), or the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, see, e.g., UTAH CODE OF JuD. ADMJN., ch. 13 Rules of Professional 
Conduct, reprinted in UTAH CouRT RULES ANN. 1,007 (Michie 1991), and in other ethical regulations, 
see, e.g., N .Y. JuD. LAW § 482 (McKinney 1983) (forbidding an attorney from employing a person to 
solicit business) . 
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
38. In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 400, 532 N .E.2d 248, 252 (1988); In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 587 . 
39. See, e.g., LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 36, DR l-102(A)(4) UTAH CODE OF JuD. ADMIN., ch. 13 
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4, reprinted in UTAH COURT RULES ANN. 1,067 (Michie 1991) 
(it is misconduct for an attorney to engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). 
40. See In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 397, 532 N .E.2d at 250; In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 17 
(N .Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983). Cf. Levy v. Association of the Bar, 37 N.Y.2d 279,281,333 
N.E.2d 350,352, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1975) (though convicted attorney is estopped from rclitigating 
his guilt, he "may . . . introduce any competent evidence . . . to explain or mitigate the significance of 
his criminal conviction" ). 
41. Supra note 28. 
42. Supra note 31 . 
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process",43 any such abridgement appears evanescent. 
The federal courts implement a similar type of bifurcated system when 
presiding over matters designated as exclusively under the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. In such federal cases, courts give preclusive effect to 
prior state court findings of fact, though not of law.44 The same reasoning 
allows courts charged with the regulation of attorneys to adopt civil court 
findings without unlawfully delegating their exclusive power to discipline 
attorneys. 
2. Rejecting Preclusive Effect for Civil Findings on Exclusive Authority 
Grounds Conflicts With Current Rules Governing the Analogous Cases of 
Criminal Conviction and Reciprocal Discipline 
Courts not only overstate the extent to which the preclusive use of prior 
findings restrains a disciplinary panel45 or the court, they also take a posi-
tion belied by their own court rules. State court rules typically provide for 
the application of collateral estoppel to the factual determinations of for-
eign disciplinary bodies and criminal courts.46 Of course the reliance of the 
hearing boards on the findings of other tribunals, including other state dis-
ciplinary committees, is not held to constitute an illegal delegation of juris-
diction over disciplinary matters;47 yet these same hearing boards cannot 
rely on the findings of civil courts applying the law of their own states. The 
preference of the courts for foreign disciplinary determinations is especially 
hard to fathom given that civil courts of law (at · least of general jurisdic-
43. In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d at 401, 532 N.E.2d at 252. 
44. Rolls Tools, Ltd. v. Herman (In re Herman), 6 Bankr. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (upholding bank-
ruptcy court's use of state court findings despite 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (giving federal courts exclusive 
federal jurisdiction)); Connelly v. Balkwill, 174 F. Supp. 49, 60-61 (N.D. Ohio 1959) (giving state 
determination of fraud preclusive effect in suit brought under § IO of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 despite 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (vesting jurisdiction over § IO suits exclusively in federal courts)), affd 
per curiam, 279 F.2d 685 (6th Cir. 1960). 
45. Despite the application of collateral estoppel, the Strong hearing ran over the course of three 
days. In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583, 585 (Utah 1980). The assertion of collateral estoppel was granted in 
a prehearing order. Id. 
46. See supra notes 14-18. 
47. Or, in the case of Utah, not a violation of Utah Code§ 78-51-18 (1987). Arguably, if one does 
not accept interpretation of this statute as one motivated by fear of ceding authority, see supra note 34, 
the court's reasoning falls prey to another deficiency. The court's reliance on the statute's intent ap-
pears misplaced. The relevant part of the statute is adopted, almost verbatim, from a preceding statute 
enacted in 1931. Compare I 931 Utah Laws ch. 48 § 10, at 168-69 ("The board shall make findings 
and reports to the supreme court as to the results of their hearings, investigations and conclusions, with 
recommendations in the premises and in all cases in which the evidence . . . justifies such a course, 
they shall recommend such disciplinary action ... as the case shall in their judgment warrant.") with 
supra note 34. Thus, the language of the statute arose long before the proposed use of preclusion had 
been contemplated. To hold that the statute was designed to prevent this use of collateral estoppel 
before the use existed is illogical. 
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tion) are traditionally held to be superior fact-finding bodies to administra-
tive hearing panels. 48 
Finally, it should be noted that rules of procedure governing disciplinary 
hearings are typically adopted from rules of civil procedure49-which ar-
gues against the notion that civil proceedings contain inherent procedural 
infirmities that make their findings unworthy of estoppel effect in discipli-
nary matters. 
3. Rejecting Collateral Estoppel for Civil Findings Seemingly Elevates the 
Disciplinary Hearing Board to a Higher Fact-Finding Position than Civil 
Courts 
Courts' reluctance to rely on civil findings does not comport with their 
reliance on determinations of their disciplinary hearings. For example, the 
Illinois Supreme Court has announced that the findings of fact made by a 
disciplinary hearing board "are entitled to virtually the same weight as the 
findings of any initial trier of facts in our judicial system."50 The court's 
use of the qualifier "virtually" implies that other initial triers of fact are 
entitled to an even greater weight than, or at least the same weight as, the 
hearing board. Yet inexplicably, the court mandates that the hearing 
board, a fact finder of lesser credence,51 reexamine the issues already ex-
amined by the civil court. 
The Utah Supreme Court also does not accord its bar's fact finding abil-
ity greater deference than civil fact finders. While the Utah Court pro-
48. See Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Adminis-
trative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 422, 453-55 (1983) (describing 
deficiencies of administrative decisions that make them unsuitable for estoppel effect) . Cf Sinha v. 
Ambach, 91 A.D.2d 703, 703, 457 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (1982) ("Due process considerations do not 
require the full panoply of procedural tools available to civil litigants in an administrative 
proceeding."). 
49. In Utah "(t)he rules of evidence and procedure applicable to the conduct of nonjury civil trials in 
the district courts of the state of Utah . . . govern the hearing on a Formal Committee Complaint." 
UTAH CooE OF Juo. ADMIN. ch. 14 R. Xll(b), reprinted in UTAH CouRT RuLEs ANN. 1,080 (Michie 
1991). Similarly, Illinois disciplinary proceedings rely on procedures and rules arising out of civil pro-
ceedings. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I JOA, para. foll. 774, at 677 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (Rules of the 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee) (Ruic 251. Scope of Discovery) ("Except as pro-
vided herein, discovery practice shall be in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules 
of the Supreme Court.") (footnotes omitted); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I JOA, para. foll. 774, at 677 (Smith-
Hurd 1985) (Rules of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Committee) (Rule 273. Evidence) 
("The admissability of matters shall be governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Rules of the 
Supreme Court.") (footnotes omitted) . 
SO. In re Bossov, 60 Ill. 2d 439, 441, 328 N.E.2d 309, 310-11 (rejecting respondent's contentions 
that findings of improper conduct were not supported by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 
432 U.S. 928 (1975) (citation omitted) . 
51. See supra note 48. 
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fesses to look upon the findings of disciplinary hearings with indulgence,52 
the Court reserves a greater prerogative to substitute its own conclusions of 
fact in disciplinary proceedings than it does with the findings of a civil 
tribunal.53 Yet the Utah Court also insists that the disciplinary panel not 
consider as binding the factual determinations made by a civil tribunal. 
Thus, civil findings are elevated over disciplinary determinations for pur-
poses of review by the state's supreme court while, inconsistently, the deter-
mination of the disciplinary panel is elevated over civil court findings at the 
disciplinary level. 
B. MUTUALITY 
Under the rule of mutuality,54 only parties to both the previous and pre-
sent actions or their privies can be bound by, or take advantage of, the 
prior determination. This rule effectively denies preclusive effect to fact-
findings in disciplinary matters. A disciplinary prosecutor cannot, in that 
role, have been a participant in a prior civil court proceeding. Accordingly, 
the mutuality requirement precludes use of a prior civil court's findings to 
estop a respondent attorney in a later disciplinary hearing. 
Courts which reject the preclusive transfer of civil findings to discipli-
nary proceedings have held that the absence of mutuality either rules out 
or calls for a heightened standard for the assertion of collateral estoppel.55 
The reasoning is, at best, strange since it is raised by courts that have 
previously discarded the mutuality requirement. For example, as justifica-
tion for rejecting the use of offensive collateral estoppel, one court pointed 
to the fact that the parties were not the same in the disciplinary proceeding 
as in the prior civil trial. 56 Previously, the same court had noted "even 
where the parties may not have been the same, where a party has had an 
issue adjudicated against him in a prior case, he should be estopped from 
52. See In re Johnston, 524 P.2d 593, 594 (Utah 1974) ("[I]n considering the findings ... of the 
Committee, [we] will indulge them with [a] presumption of correctness and propriety") . 
53. Compare In re Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d I, 2, 474 P.2d 116, 116 (1970) ("(T]he findings of the 
Utah State Bar should be adopted by this court unless they appear to be . . . not in accord with the 
preponderance of the evidence .. . . ") with Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 
1990) ("Findings of fact .. . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . ... " (quoting UTAH R. 
C1v. P. 52(a)). 
54. See supra note 9. 
. 55. Infra notes 56, 58 and accompanying text . 
56. The use of preclusion "would be correct under ordinary circumstances where a subsequent trial 
is being held involving the same parties .. . . However, this is not an adversary proceeding." In re 
Strong, 6 I 6 P.2d 583, 587 (Utah 1980). Notably, this position directly conflicts with that of the United 
States Supreme Court. See In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1968) (characterizing disciplinary 
proceedings as "adversary proceedings" and reversing respondent's disbarment due to a deni~I of proce-
dural due process). 
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relitigating that issue in a subsequent case."57 
Similarly, another court indicated that the fall of mutuality called for a 
heightened prudence in the assertion of offensive coll.ateral estoppel to en-
sure that preclusion fostered economy and fairness. 58 But the court went on 
to admit that the issue of judicial economy was not implicated in that 
case59 and neglected to show how the preclusion would result in unfairness. 
Furthermore, the court rejected the conclusive use of civil findings in all 
disciplinary cases60 as offering too little in the way of efficiency and risking 
too much in the way of unfair results. This outright rejection appears at 
odds with the collateral estoppel standard that it "should be applied only as 
fairness and justice require under the circumstances of each case. " 61 
Therefore, the mutuality argument must be rejected. The fact that the 
state bar, rather than the plaintiff in the prior action, prosecutes a discipli-
nary complaint should not, by itself, prevent the assertion of collateral es-
toppel in a disciplinary hearing. 
C. VIGOR OF FIRST LITIGATION/FORESEEABILITY OF SUBSEQUENT USE OF 
CIVIL FINDINGS 
Another requirement for invocation of collateral estoppel is the foresee-
ability of the subsequent use of a court's findings, which is primarily used 
as a proxy to measure the vigor in the first litigation. That is, one examines 
whether the subsequent litigation was sufficiently foreseeable so that the 
defendant had adequate incentive to defend vigorously the former action. 
At least one court has ruled that a civil fraud action, as opposed to a crimi-
nal charge involving moral turpitude, does not sufficiently ensure a vigorous 
defense.62 · 
Rejection of collateral estoppel because the prior civil matter may not 
have been vigorously litigated by the attorney is unpersuasive. The appre-
hension that an insufficient effort to defend will be made in the prior civil 
litigation is understandable in some instances and is provided for under 
57. International Resources v. Dun field, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah I 979) (allowing the use of non-
party offensive collateral estoppel). 
58. In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390, 398-99, 532 N.E.2d 248, 251 (1988) . 
59. Id. at 399, 532 N.E.2d at 251 ("this consideration [judicial economy] does not directly apply to 
this disciplinary case"). 
60. We will not, however, go beyond permitting the conclusive use of a criminal conviction and 
begin giving offensive collateral estoppel effect in a disciplinary proceeding to factual findings 
in a civil fraud action. The risk of unfairly imposed discipline is too great, and the economy 
to be gained too minimal, to warrant such an abridgement of the discipline process. 
Id. at 401, 532 N .E.2d at 252. See also In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 587. 
61. Fred Olson Motor Serv. v. Container Corp. of America, 81 Ill . App. 3d 825, 830, 401 N .E.2d 
1098, 1102 (1980). 
62. In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d at 400-01, 532 N.E.2d at 252. 
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traditional collateral estoppel doctrines.63 But, where the initial civil action 
alleges conduct such as fraud, this apprehension seems misplaced.64 
D. DISPARATE BURDENS OF PROOF 
Criminal trials require the highest of all evidentiary standards: beyond a 
reasonable doubt.65 Typically, the standard of proof in civil cases is a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.66 Certain civil cases of a serious nature require 
a higher burden, clear and convincing evidence, which lies somewhere be-
tween a simple preponderance and beyond a reasonable doubt. Common 
law fraud is an example of a civil cause of action requiring the plaintiff to 
meet the clear and convincing burden.67 
The standard of proof in lawyer disciplinary hearings in most states is 
"clear and convincing evidence."68 Some states impose a standard substan-
63. Collateral estoppel allows for exceptions where the initial action offers little impetus to litigate 
forcefully. Posit a case where the worst outcome has minimal consequences upon a defendant. In light 
of the mild consequences, the defendant has little incentive to present a vigorous or expensive defense. 
Should the plaintiff prove successful and then seek to use findings from the first determination preclu-
sively in a second, larger claim, a court will likely deny an assertion of collateral estoppel. See Gilberg 
v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d 285,423 N.E.2d 807,441 N .Y.S.2d 49 (1981) (though arising out of a nomi-
nally criminal trial, prior findings of minor harassment violation should not be accorded conclusive 
effect in subsequent civil suit seeking $250,000). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 28 
comment d ( 1982) ("procedures available in the first court may . . . be wholly inappropriate to the 
determination of the same issues when presented in the context of a much larger claim") . 
64. Thus, given the nature of the conduct alleged in Owens, which the court labeled "reprehensible," 
In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 401, 532 N .E.2d at 253, a lackluster defense seemed highly unlikely. The 
civil court's damages award was indicative of the egregious nature of the alleged conduct. Though the 
court awarded only $2,000 in compensatory damages, each respondent was assessed $60,000 in punitive 
damages. Id. at 394, 532 N.E.2d at 249. Moreover, the civil trial lasted 12 or 13 days, Brief for 
Respondents at 17, In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390, 532 N.E.2d 248 (1988) (No. 67040), and the respon-
t;ient attorneys incurred substantial legal expenses to defend the suit. Brief for the Administrator at 9, 
Owens (No. 67040) . However, based on the time and expense involved, the defendants decided not to 
appeal the trial court's judgment. Brief for Respondent at 17, Owens (No. 67640). Thus, the Illinois 
Supreme Court could have properly denied preclusive effect on the grounds that the determination of 
the trial court was based on two counts, breach of the partnership agreement and breach of fiduciary 
duty, either of which would independently support the result. See In re Cohn, No. M-5696 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27 comment i (1982) (alter-
native determinations by court in the first instance). But cf Malloy v. Trombley, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 405 
N .E.2d 213, 427 N. Y .S.2d 969 (1980) (acknowledging the Restatement rule but according estoppel 
effect to an unappealed determination resting on alternative grounds). 
65. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 379, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 274, cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 858 (1981); Crowall v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 120, 126 n.5, 346 N.W.2d 327, 331 
n.5 (Ct. App. 1984). 
66. See, e.g., Andis v. Newlin, 442 N.E.2d 1106, I 108 (Ind. 1982). 
67. See, e.g., Cole v. Ignatius, 114111._App. 3d 66, 74,448 N.E.2d 538,544 (1983); Orbit Holding 
Corp. v. Anthony Hotel Corp., 121 A.D.2d 311, 314, 503 N.Y.S.2d 780, 782 (1986). But see, e.g., 
Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278, 289-90, 562 P.2d 316, 320-21, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 641-42 (1977) 
(civil fraud need only be proved by preponderance of the evidence). 
68. See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 3.4.4, at 109 ("most commonly employed standard"); Law. 
1991] A BASIS FOR ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 17 
tially equivalent to "clear and convincing" but their formulations include 
the term "preponderance," thereby implying a somewhat lower standard.69 
Still other states require only a showing of misconduct by a "fair prepon-
derance" of the evidence.70 One state requires disciplinary prosecutors to 
prove their complaint "beyond a reasonable doubt."71 
When the standard of proof in the disciplinary action is higher than in 
the prior civil suit, courts reject giving collateral estoppel effect to the prior 
civil findings. 72 Disciplinary courts have also sought to justify the rejection 
of collateral estoppel for civil findings while granting it for criminal convic-
tions73 on the grounds of the higher burden of proof required for the con-
viction; this higher standard enables the disciplinary court to rely more 
confidently on a criminal conviction than on the finding of the civil court.74 
However, not only do civil courts regularly give preclusive effect to deter-
minations based on the same standard of proof75 but at least one court has 
explicitly disavowed the idea that the assertion of collateral estoppel in dis-
ciplinary hearings requires that the standard in the prior adjudication have 
been higher than that for the disciplinary hearing.76 In Georgia, where dis-
ciplinary violations must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt,77 
such a margin of error requirement would rule out the application of col-
lateral estoppel to even criminal convictions. Georgia, however, does in fact 
Man., supra note 13, at 101 :2103-04. 
69. See Law. Man., supra note 13, at 101:2102. 
70. See id. at 2102. 
: 7 I. Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga. App. 371, 375, 170 S.E.2d 732, 735 ( 1969) (finding of miscon-
duct in Georgia requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 910 (1970). 
72. In re Gygi, 273 Or. at ,448, 541 P.2d at 1395. 
73 . ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I JOA, para. 761 , at 635 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (" proof of conviction is conclu-
sive of the attorney's guilt of crime"). 
74. " [T]his court can more confidently rely on a criminal conviction as resting on accurate factual 
findings. " In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390,401 , 532 N.E.2d 248,252 (1988) . Like the majority of states, 
Illinois requires that disciplinary violations be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re Betts, 109 
Ill . 2d 154, 175, 485 N.E.2d 1081, 1089 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1105 (1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. 
ch. I JOA, para. 753. 
75. E.g., Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Bd .. 78 Ill . 2d I, 398 N.E.2d 9 
( 1979) (allowing the use of non party issue preclusion between two proceedings each requiring a "pre-
ponderance of the evidence" standard of proof), cited with approval in 'In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 399, 
532 N.E.2d at 252 (1988). 
76. While the burden of proof in attorney disciplinary cases ("clear and convincing") is lower 
than "beyond a reasonable doubt," the cases do not suggest that the conclusive effect given 
to convictions is based on a suggested safety margin resulting from that difference. The im-
portant consideration is the binding determination resulted from a trial where the burden 
was no less than the disciplinary proceeding. 
In re Coruzzi, 95 N.J. 557, 571 n.7, 472 A.2d 546, 553 n.7 (emphasis in original), appeal dismissed, 
Coruzzi v. New Jersey, 469 U.S. 802 (1984). 
77. See, e.g., Cushway v. State Bar, 120 Ga. App. 371 , 170 S.E.2d 732 (1969), cert. denied, 398 
U.S. 910 (1970). . 
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apply collateral estoppel to convictions of felonies and misdemeanors in-
volving moral turpitude. 78 
The courts' failure to explain why attorney disciplinary proceedings re-
quire the added margin of safety offered by the higher standard in criminal 
tribunals before preclusive effect can be granted is exacerbated by compar-
ison to like situations in other self-regulating professions. In contrast to 
attorney disciplinary proceedings, courts have upheld the preclusive use of 
adverse civil findings against other professionals in subsequent administra-
tive "disciplinary" proceedings.79 Additionally, no court has enunciated 
why a higher standard is not required for the assertion of collateral estop-
pel in reciprocal disciplinary action80 though the tension in the two posi-
tions has been acknowledged.81 
V. ANALYSIS UNDER PARKLANE DICTATES THAT CIVIL FINDINGS BE 
GIVEN COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT IN DIS.CIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
The appropriateness of offensive collateral estoppel is well measured 
against the four requirements enunciated in the leading collateral estoppel 
case, Parklane Hosiery v. Shore:82 1) could the plaintiff have joined the 
earlier action; 2) was the subsequent litigation foreseeable; 3) · was the 
judgment inconsistent with other proceedings; and, 4) does the subsequent 
~ction offer procedural opportunities unavailable to the defendant in the 
prior action. 83 The Parklane standards, first announced for federal courts 
78. See GEORGIA COURT RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rules and Regulations for the Organization and 
Government of the State Bar of Georgia, Rule 4-102, Standard 66, at 725 (West 1983) ("conviction in 
any jurisdiction . . . shall be conclusive evidence of conviction and of infraction of this rule") . 
79. See Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 727 P.2d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (approving 
use of civil court's finding to estop physician, in hearing before state board of examiners, from denying 
he had committed negligent malpractice) . Cf Richards v. Gordon, 254 Cal. App. 2d 735, 742, 62 Cal. 
Rptr. 466, 470-71 (2d Dist. 1967) (holding realtor, in proceeding before state real estate commission, 
was collaterally estopped from impeaching prior findings of fraud because applicable statute specifically 
provided that a prior civil judgment of fraud was grounds for disciplinary action). Although the Rich-
ards court relied on a specific statutory provision, courts do not require such a provision to grant preclu-
sive effect to prior findings. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1976) 
(adopting a Florida policy of granting estoppel effect to foreign disciplinary agencies' findings and 
noting "the absence of a rule [in Kentucky] need not impede the application of a sound principle"); In 
re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983) ("We see no reason why 
the ,application of collateral estoppel to disciplinary proceedings should be limited to the instances cov-
ered by the rule." ). 
80. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I JOA, para. 763 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (codifying the doctrine of 
issue preclusion in circumstances where Illinois disciplinary' proceedings are brought based on discipline 
in another jurisdiction). 
81. In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390, 402, 532 N.E.2d 248, 253 (1988) ("By this opinion, we in no way 
intend to alter disposition of reciprocal disciplinary matters brought pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 
763 [(Reciprocal Disciplinary Action)]."). 
82. 438 U.S. 322 (1979). 
83. Id. at 331-32. 
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and subsequently adopted by most state courts,84 apprise a tribunal of 
whether or not the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity to defend 
in the first action and provide guidelines for assessing the resultant effi-
ciency and fairness of invoking collateral estoppel.85 
A. COULD THE PLAINTIFF HA VE JOINED THE EARLIER ACTION? 
Courts should deny collateral estoppel effect to plaintiffs who refused the 
opportunity to join an earlier suit.86 Making estoppel available to these 
plaintiffs multiplies litigation; instead of joining the prior action, they 
would rather wait for a judgment and, if adverse to the defendant, then use 
it to estop the defendant from contesting the adverse finding. 87 
Allowing the use of collateral estoppel by disciplinary committees poses 
no problem of increased litigation by discouraging joinder. As a practical 
matter, the disciplinary prosecutor-in that role--cannot have joined an 
earlier civil action. Thus the availability of preclusion will not encourage 
any additional proceedings. 88 Collateral estoppel, though, will permit a nar-
rowing of the issues to be examined in that proceeding.89 By adopting a 
blanket policy of allowing the relitigation of issues already determined, the 
courts expend judicial resources that would have been conserved, or other-
wise deployed, under the traditional parameters of collateral estoppel. 
B. WAS T,HE SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION FORESEEABLE? 
The second factor examines whether the subsequent litigation was fore-
seeable so that the defendant had every incentive to defend the action vig-
orously. Just as physicians should foresee that civil determinations of mal-
practice can lead to administrative proceedings,90 so too should attorneys be 
84. See, e.g., In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 398-99, 532 N.E.2d at 251-52. 
85. FRIEDENTHAL. KANE & MILLER, supra note 7, at 691-93 . The Owens court even purports to use 
some of the Parklane criteria yet nevertheless manages to reach a result different than that dicta~ by 
the criteria. See In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 398-400, 532 N.E.2d at 251-52. 
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 29(3) (1982). Cf In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 398-
99, 532 N.E.2d at 331. 
87 . See Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J . Super. 560, 571-572, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965) ("To allow plaintiffs 
the benefit of the first judgment may actually increase litigation . . . . Two chances are better than 
one.") If courts arc not wary of making estoppel available where there are inconsistent judgments, the 
courts will encourage scriatim litigation, rather than joined litigation. 
88. The disciplinary authorities arc much like the shareholder plaintiffs in Parklane who were una-
ble to join the SEC action. See Parklanc Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (I 979) ("respondent 
probably could not have joined in the [SEC] injunctive action had he so desired") . 
89. See Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior litigation, 39 IOWA L. REV. 217,220 (1954) 
("[C]ollateral estoppel does not prevent subsequent litigation but only tends to narrow the area of 
conflict in the second action by preventing the relitigation of issues already decided.") . 
90. See Bassett v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 727 P.2d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). The Bassett 
court labelled the possibility of disciplinary action subsequent to an adverse civil finding "distinctly 
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aware of the possibility of disciplinary action arising out of civil findings. 
In both Strong and Owens, the possibility of subsequent disciplinary action 
was readily apparent.91 Both of the civil actions alleged actual fraud.92 Ac-
tual fraud, civil or criminal, violates DR l-l02(A)(4) of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility,93 which defined misconduct at the time of both tri-
als in their respective states.94 Additionally, .once the policy of adopting 
civil findings in disciplinary proceedings is instituted and made known, the 
possibility of subsequent disciplinary action will be unquestionably 
foreseeable. 95 
C. WAS THE JUDGMENT INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER PROCEEDINGS? 
Consistency of judgments is one of the benefits yielded by the proper 
application of collateral estoppel.96 By allowing attorneys to relitigate ad-
verse findings in disciplinary proceedings, however, the courts are enabling 
inconsistent judgments to arise. Two different fact-finding bodies, each 
reaching different conclusions based upon the same operative facts, under-
foreseeable." The court based this conclusion on a provision of the Professions and Occupations Code 
that required individuals found liable for negligence to notify the board of examiners. Hence, the court 
noted, Bassett "had every incentive to defend the civil suit fully and vigorously." Id. at 866. 
9 I. Since foreseeability is used primarily as a proxy to measure the vigor in the first litigation, ar-
guably a lack of foreseeability would still not have ruled out preclusion in In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 
532 N .E.2d 248 (1988), or in In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 (Utah 1980). The prior civil proceedings in 
both Strong, which was pursued to a denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, and Owens, cf supra 
note 64 (thirteen day trial and significant legal expense), were vigorously contested. Besides foreseeabil-
ity of future disciplinary actions, attorneys may have other incentives to defend civil suits vigorously, 
such as a large financial liability or a blemished reputation. For example, when one of the authors 
called the Franklin County, Illinois, courthouse to inquire about photocopies of part of the file from the 
original civil case in Owens, the court personnel knew the file simply by caption despite the passage of 
almost nine years since the trial. Telephone conversation with Clerk's Office, Franklin County (Ill .) 
Courthouse (Nov. 13, 1989). 
92. See In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d at 394, 532 N.E.2d al 249; In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 584. 
93. R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 20 (2d ed. 1988). 
94. Utah and Illinois each had adopted a form of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility at 
the times of Strong and Owens, respectively. Both have since changed to a form of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 1 I0A, at 115 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (Illi-
nois Rules of Professional Conduct); UTAH CODE OF JuD. ADMIN. ch.13, Rules of Professional Conduct, 
reprinted in UTAH COURT RULES ANN. 1,007 (Michie 1991). The Model Rule equivalent to DR l-
102(A)(4) is Model Ruic 8.4. Compare MODEL CODE, supra note I, DR l-102(A)(4) with MODEL 
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 8.4. 
95. Since the great weight of current case law rejects the preclusive use of civil findings, arguably 
today the subsequent use of collateral estoppel effect is not foreseeable. Cf Berner v. British Common-
wealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532, 540 (2d Cir. 1965) (Withholding preclusive effect, in part, because 
"even if this case might not be subject to a federal rule including the elimination of mutuality (see 
Zdanok) the defendants should not be confronted with the Zdanok rule . . . . At the conclusion of the 
[previous] trial, Zdanok had not been decided."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). 
96. By fostering finality of determination, collateral estoppel "strengthens litigant faith in the sys-
tem, promotes fairness, and provides inter-forum consistency of results." Note, supra note 7, at 822-23 . 
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mines public confidence in the legal system.97 This possibility is especially 
troublesome in the context of attorney disciplinary hearings.98 
In addition to a conflict between fact finders, the public may also be 
faced with the unseemly circumstance of an attorney being found to have 
engaged in fraudulent conduct by a judge or jury and then exonerated 
upon the same facts by the profession's special fact finder. That the second 
opportunity to litigate is granted attorneys in contravention of the conven-
tional rules of collateral estoppel that apply to others accentuates the ap-
pearance of professionally self-serving behavior.99 
D. DOES THE SUBSEQUENT ACTION OFFER PROCEDURAL OPPORTUNITIES 
UNAVAILABLE IN THE PRIOR ACTION? 
Park/ane's last factor considers whether or not the subsequent litigation 
offers procedural opportunities to the plaintiff likely to yield a different out-
come.100 Since disciplinary proceedings are adversarial 101 and draw much of 
their procedure from state rules of civil procedure, 102 the existence of spe-
97. See McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REV. 707, 707 (1976) 
("The spectre of public dismay over a system that decides like cases differently is a disturbing one."); 
Wise, I Case, 2 Appeals, 2 Rulings: How Come?: First Department Fail-Safe Measures Fail in Con-
tradictory Decisions in Criminal Case, N.Y.L.J., May 7, 1990, at I, col. 5 (discussing how two panels 
of the same court treated the same issue-the legality of a search-and arrived at opposite positions on 
the identical issues of law and fact raised in a single trial). Lawyers speculated that the difference in 
outcomes resulted primarily from the different judges sitting on each panel. Hence, the "one-in-a-mil-
lion case" portended a decision process that depended more on who the sitting appellate judges were 
than on facts and law. The statement by the presiding justice that "this should not have happened" 
refers to the court's failure to note that two panels had been selected to hear the same case and not to 
the fact of the difference in outcomes. 
98. In re Fogel, 422 A.2d 966, 969 (D.C . 1980) (supplemental statement by Harris, J .) ("consis-
tency and fairness are vital objections in the disciplinary process") . For a discussion of the negative 
effects of inconsistent disciplinary responses see Note, Toward a Uniform System of Attorney Fee 
Forfeiture, 9 CARDOZO L. REV . 1859 (1988) (presenting a framework for assisting courts in imposing 
sanctions against lawyers who misbehave) . 
99. Cf. In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 2 (N .Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983) ("We 
perceive no reason why a member of the Bar should be accorded a significantly more favored position 
than are others in the application of this principle [collateral estoppel], particularly in a matter in 
which the public interest is at stake." (quoting Levy v. Association of the Bar, 37 N .Y.2d 279,281,333 
N .E.2d 350,352,372 N .Y.S.2d 41, 43 (1975))) . For other special rules favoring attorneys, see Brick-
man & Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Con-
tract law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV . 149, 151 & n.9 (1988) (discussing nonrefundable retainers as a spe-
cial rule favoring attorneys and comparing the standards for medical and legal malpractice). 
100. In instances of the application of collateral estoppel against the attorney, these would have to be , 
procedural opportunities in disciplinary hearings likely to yield a favorable res·u1t to an attorney where 
an adverse judgment was rendered against the attorney in a previous civil suit. It is not clear that the 
bar would admit to such procedures if they existed. 
IOI. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S . 544, 551 (1968) . 
102. See supra note 49. 
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cial favorable opportunities in disciplinary hearings should be rare. 103 Fur-
ther, in light of Park lane's rejection of the argument that a jury trial is a 
procedural opportunity calling for the defeat of a collateral estoppel mo-
tion, a hearing in front of an attorney disciplinary board is unlikely to qual-
ify as a procedural opportunity that makes a different outcome likely. 
Thus, the Parklane analysis suggests that civil findings should be eligible 
for collateral estoppel effect in disciplinary hearings. Presently, two courts 
agree and appear willing to grant civil findings such effect. 
VI. ADOPTION OF COLLATERAL £STOPPEL 
Application of collateral estoppel to disciplinary matters has been re-
jected by two courts which have directly addressed the issue. 104 While no 
103. This docs not refer to criticism of lawyer discipline that focuses on the self-regulatory aspect 
and the undeniable fact that "[d]isciplinary bodies dismiss the vast majority of complaints as outside 
their jurisdiction or unfounded." R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 156 (1989) . See also id. at 293-97 
(setting forth selected statistics for outcomes of complaints and disciplinary proceedings) . 
104. See In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 390, 532 N.E.2d 248 (1988); In re Strong, 616 P.2d 583 (Utah 
1980). Strong was a disciplinary proceeding brought after a civil finding, Holdsworth v. Strong, No. C-
190-73 (D. Utah Dec. 21, 1974), ajfd, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 
(1977), that an attorney had committed common-law fraud and violated Rule I0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 
240. I0b-5. The trial court found Strong knowingly and intentionally made false representations to in-
duce a stock sale. Holdsworth v. Strong, No. C-190-73, slip op. at 11-12, 15. The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed both the district court finding of common-law fraud and the finding of I0b-5 violations. 545 
F.2d at 687. Petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied. 430 U.S. at 955. 
Based on the findings by the district court that Strong had committed common-law fraud, the Discipli-
nary Screening Committee of the Utah State Bar lodged a complaint. In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 584. 
The Hearing Panel granted preclusive effect to the findings of the federal district court, prohibited the 
respondent from introducing evidence inconsistent with the district court's findings, id. at 587, and 
eventually recommended disbarment. Id. at 583. 
Owens was also a disciplinary action that followed a civil fraud case. The trial court, applying a 
"clear and convincing" standard of proof, found the respondent attorneys had committed a fraudulent 
breach of fiduciary duty and a fraudulent breach of the partnership agreement. In re Owens, 125 Ill . 2d 
at 394, 532 N.E.2d at 249. Respondents had ente(ed into a partnership with clients to operate a radio 
station. Respondents dissolved the partnership without informing their partners and then formed a new 
partnership under the same name as the original. However, only the respondents comprised the new 
partnership. They obtained an F.C.C. license for the new partnership and began operations and broad-
casting. Id. at 396, 532 N.E.2d at 250. In the subsequent disciplinary hearing, the respondents were 
charged with violations of DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
and misrepresentation); DR l-102(A)(5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice); DR 5-104(A) (entering into a business transaction with clients in which the attorney and client 
have conflicting interests, without the client's consent after full disclosure); DR 7-I0l(A)(3) (intention-
ally prejudicing or damaging their clients during the professional relationship); DR 7-102(A)(5) (mak-
ing a false statement of fact); and engaging in conduct that gives the appearance of impropriety. Id. at 
393-94, 532 N.E.2d at 249. The Administrator of the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commis-
sion moved for summary judgment relying on the findings of the civil court; the hearing board granted 
the motion. Id. at 395, 532 N.E.2d at 249-50. The respondents were precluded from contesting the civil 
findings and were allowed to present evidence in mitigation, including limited evidence regarding the 
underlying facts . Id. at 395, 532 N.E.2d at 250. Based on the civil findings, the hearing board adjudged 
the respondents to have committed all ethical breaches alleged, except DR l-102(A)(5), and recom-
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published decision has yet granted estoppel effect to civil findings in an 
attorney disciplinary matter, 105 some courts, faced with a motion for collat-
eral estoppel by disciplinary authorities, 106 have nevertheless addressed the 
motion as a legitimate manner of proceeding107 rather than dismissing the 
possibility as inapplicable to a disciplinary procedure. 108 
In one case, a court denied prior civil findings collateral estoppel effect in 
a disciplinary proceeding because the standard of proof called for in the 
disciplinary proceeding was higher than that required in the civil litiga-
tion.109 Because the court discussed but did not reject the applicability of 
collateral estoppel, it may be viewed as having given tacit approval to the 
use of preclusive civil findings in attorney disciplinary hearings. 110 
mended to the supreme court that a two-year suspension be imposed. Id. at 397, 532 N.E.2d at 250. 
Based on the committees' application of collateral estoppel to civil findings in attorney disciplinary 
hearings, the supreme courts of both states rejected the findings and recommendations of their discipli-
nary committees. Notably, the courts did not reject collateral estoppel due to the particular circum-
stance of either case. Rather, the courts ruled that using civil findings in an attorney disciplinary mat-
ter was inappropriate in all instances. 
105. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
I 06. Courts routinely dismiss assertions of collateral estoppel by attorneys when respondents attempt 
to set up previous unsuccessful criminal suits or disciplinary actions against the respondent. See Florida 
Bar v. Musich, 453 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1984)) (" 'The acquittal of an accused in a criminal proceed-
ing shall not necessarily be a bar to disciplinary proceedings.' Th[is] rule [,Florida Bar Integration 
Rule, article XI, Rule l l .04(2)(c),) is justified by the different standard of proof of guilt in the two 
proceedings.") Although the attorney in Mus/eh was found not guilty in a criminal trial due to insanity, 
the disciplinary hearing found that the respondent appreciated the criminality of his conduct at the 
time it was carried out and recommended disciplinary action. The findings and the recommendation 
were accepted by the court. See also Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So. 2d 210 (Miss. 1987) (en 
bane) (dismissal of earlier disciplinary complaint did not preclude subsequent complaint because no 
issue was litigated and no final judgment arose from the dismissal). 
107. See In re Cohn, No. M-5696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983); In re Gygi, 273 Or. 
443, 541 P.2d 1392 (1975). 
108. See In re Owens, 125 Ill. 2d 390, 532 N.E.2d 248 (1988); In re Strong, 616 P.2d at 585. 
109. In re Gygi, 273 Or. at 448, 541 P.2d at 1395 ("Collateral estoppel is not applicable when the 
standard of proof in the second proceeding is greater than that which applied in the first .") (citing 
Strachan Shipping Co. v. Shea, 276 F. Supp. 610, 614 (S.D. Tex. 1967), aff d, 406 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921 ( 1969)) (replying to motion by counsel for the state bar seeking preclusion 
of an attorney, relying on a prior securities fraud suit). 
The disciplinary authority asserted that a finding of attorney liability in the prior securities suit, 
Blakely v. Lissac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Or. 1972), precluded the respondent from contesting charges 
that the attorney prepared a prospectus and annual report containing representations he knew, or 
should have known, to be false. In re Gygi, 273 Or. at 445, 541 P.2d at 1394. The securities suit 
charged, inter alia, violations of Ruic I 0b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.1 0b-5). Though there was an initial 
finding that the respondent was liable, the suit was later settled and a final judgment was issued dis-
missing the suit. In re Gygi, 273 Or. at 446, 541 P.2d at 1394. 
110. The Supreme Court of Oregon has confirmed that Gygi supports the assertion of collateral 
estoppel to civil findings in subsequent disciplinary hearings. See In re Jordan, 295 Or. 142, 149, 665 
P.2d 341, 345 (1983) ("[W)c have indicated previously that collateral estoppel may be used in Bar 
disciplinary proceedings against an accused in some circumstances.'' ) (citing In re Gygi). 
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In another decision, 111 a court examined the application for reinstate-
ment of a respondent/attorney who had been estopped from contesting the 
findings of a prior civil suit 112 in a later disciplinary hearing. The court 
merely noted the use of collateral estoppel at the hearing level as it re_. 
viewed the course of the respondent's disciplinary proceedings. It did not 
address or comment on the preclusive use of the prior findings; instead, it 
focused only on the application for reinstatement. In the prior action, a 
federal district court found, and the circuit court affirmed, that the attor-
ney, after failing to receive the consent necessary for a reorganization, had 
nevertheless counselled and aided his clients in the effectuation of the reor-
ganization though it violated the clients's fiduciary obligation to a partner-
ship.113 The circuit court also affirmed findings that the attorney had 
threatened an individual with bas~less litigation in order to coerce the indi-
vidual into consenting to a transfer of partnership assets. 114 Based solely on 
these findings, 115 the disciplinary hearing panel found the attorney brought 
fraudulent lawsuits116 merely to harass or injure, 117 and to have advised 
clients in the furtherance of a fraudulent goal. 118 This use of collateral es-
toppel, however, never garnered the imprimatur of a court. After applying 
collateral estoppel, the hearing panel recommended a reprimand. Because 
the attorney accepted the reprimand and the Committee on Grievances did 
not have a right to appeal the hearing panel decision, the original hearing 
panel decision did not come before a court. 119 Therefore, left unscrutinized 
by the court deciding the application for reinstatement, 120 the issue of col-
lateral estoppel never came under court scrutiny. 
New York Appellate Division's First Department, however, in an unpub-
lished decision, has given an unequivocal endorsement of the use of collat-
eral estoppel. The First Department has indicated that it is prepared to 
allow civil findings to be used preclusively in attorney disciplinary proceed-
111. In re Persky, 92 A.D.2d 372, 374, 460 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318, reh'g denied, 94 A.D.2d 23, 462 
N.Y.S.2d 860 (1983). 
112. See Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, (1976-77 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 
95,649, at 90,214 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 1976) (No. 71 Civ. 685), affd in part and rev'd in part, 563 F.2d 
1057, 1080 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). 
113. See Newburger, 563 F.2d at 1080. 
114. See id. at 1077, 1079. 
115. The Disciplinary Committee Hearing Panel's reliance on the district court opinion is outlined in 
Presiding Justice Murphy's dissent from Persky's reinstatement. See In re Persky, 92 A.D.2d at 380-81, 
460 N.Y.S.2d at 321-22 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
116. Violating DR l-102(A)(4). 
117. Violating DR 7-102(A)(I). 
118. Violating DR 7-102(A)(7). 
119. In re Persky, 92 A.D.2d at 374,460 N.Y.S.2d at 317. 
120. Respondent was suspended for two years based on a conviction of filing false statements with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. See In re Persky, 49 A.D.2d 353, 374 N.Y.S.2d 665 (1975). 
This matter was unrelated to the matter at issue in the proceeding invoking collateral estoppel. 
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ings. In a disciplinary hearing, 121 the court was faced with a motion by 
disciplinary authorities to estop a respondent attorney from contesting the 
findings of prior litigations, 122 one in a federal district court 123 and the other 
in a Florida civil court of general jurisdiction. 124 The court declined to al-
low the assertion of estoppel in this instance but only after performing a 
plenary analysis dictated by conventional rules and goals of collateral es-
toppel doctrine. The denial was predicated on different grounds for each 
case. 
In the Florida action, the court revoked the admission of a codicil on 
grounds that the attorney had misrepresented what it was that he had 
given the client to sign. The court also found that the testator lacked testa-
mentary capacity at the execution, offering an alternative basis for revok-
ing the codicil. The Florida court's finding was therefore denied preclusive 
effect because the determination of the court rested on alternative 
grounds. 125 The efficiencies sought through collateral estoppel require that 
in such a situation the alternative holdings not be given preclusive effect. 
Granting such effect would induce parties to continue to litigate issues even 
though outcomes in the litigation at hand would not be altered. 126 Indeed, 
121. In re Cohn, No. M-5696 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't July 20, 1983). 
122. For a detailed explication of the misconduct at issue, see In re Cohn, 118 A.D.2d 15, 26-44, 
503 N.Y.S.2d 759, 765-77, appeal denied and stay denied, 68 N.Y.2d 712, 497 N.E.2d 698, 506 
N.Y.S.2d 331 (1986). 
123. SEC v. Pied Piper Yacht Charters Corp., No. 71 Civ. 5341 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1976). Under 
an escrow agreement, respondent was to maintain in escrow twenty-five thousand dollars and two 
yachts. One yacht could be sold if replaced in escrow with ninety-four thousand dollars. The second 
yacht was not to be "sold, transferred, hypothecated, pledged or otherwise disposed of." 118 A.D.2d at 
26, 503 N. Y .S.2d at 766. The first yacht was sold and the ninety-four thousand dollars disbursed to the 
client proved irretrievable. The second yacht was remortgaged, subsequently sunk ( while chartered by 
respondent's law firm) and part of the insurance proceeds were disbursed. The court held that the 
dispersals violated the escrow agreement. See generally In re Cohn, 118 A.D.2d at 26-34, 503 
N.Y.S.2d at 765-70. 
124. In re Estate of Rosentiel, No. 76-436 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dade County June 24, 1976) (court revoked 
codicil appointing attorney as additional executor and trustee, finding that the attorney misrepresented 
to the decedent the nature, content and purpose of the codicil when the decedent executed the 
document). 
125. A general verdict resting on independent alternative grounds makes the findings of the court 
ineligible for collateral estoppel effect. See Halpern v. Schwartz, 426 F.2d 102, 105-106 (2d Cir. 1970); 
In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 8; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 27 comment i at 259 
( 1982) ("If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues, either of 
which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judgment is not conclusive 
with respect to either issue standing alone."). Cf Hinchey v. Sellers, 7 N.Y.2d 287, 296, 165 N.E.2d 
156, 159, 197 N.Y.S.2d 129, 134 (1959) (only findings essential to a judgment may be given preclusive 
effect in a subsequent proceeding). But cf Malloy v. Trombley, 50 N.Y.2d 46, 49, 405 N.E.2d 213, 
215, 427 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971-72 (1980) (acknowledging the Restatement rule but according estoppel 
effect to an unappealed determination resting on alternative grounds). 
126. The respondent's decision not to appeal the finding of misrepresentation may have been due to a 
resignation that the finding of a lack of testamentary capacity would have been affirmed, thus uphold-
ing the codicil's recision. 
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preclusive effect in this circumstance fosters inefficiency. 127 
In the federal court case, the federal district court, as part of a contempt 
proceeding, found the respondent had breached an escrow agreement by 
allowing dissipation of the fund. Though no specific disciplinary rule was 
designated, the breach of an escrow agreement constitutes a violation of 
DR 9-102 (preserving identity of client funds and property). The respon-
dent was given twenty days to reconstitute the escrow fund or be found in 
contempt. The respondent complied and avoided contempt. The appellate 
division also refrained from allowing the determination of the federal con-
tempt proceeding to estop the respondent based on the notions of fairness 
that preclusion should not be used where a party "could not ... have ob-
tained review of the judgment in the initial action." 128 
Despite rejecting the application of collateral estoppel in the Cohn mat-
ter, the appellate division strongly endorsed the application of collateral 
estoppel to transfer civil findings to disciplinary hearings. 129 The court 
127. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS title E, introductory note, at 249 (1982). "(I]f a 
party is aware of the potential (and perhaps not wholly foreseeable) preclusive effects of a judgment, he 
may feel compelled to over-litigate an issue, or pursue an appeal that might not otherwise be taken, out 
of fear of the consequences in later litigation." Id. 
128. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982) (Exceptions to the General Rule pf 
Issue Preclusion). Since a party can appeal a contempt judgment only after a court has sought to 
exercise its authority to coerce compliance or punish failure to comply, see United State Steel Corp. v. 
Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979), and the respondent complied 
with the court order, the court never moved against him. Therefore, he was never in a position to appeal 
the contempt judgment. The court indicated that, absent the availability of appeal, the contempt order 
would not qualify as a final judgment. In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 12. A final judgment is a 
prerequisite to the invocation of collateral estoppel. See People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37, 503 
N.E.2d 996, 1000, 511 N .Y.S.2d 565, 569 (1986) ("collateral estoppel applies only when there has 
been a final judgment"); Ott v. Bararsh, 109 A.D.2d 254, 262, 491 N.Y.S.2d 661, 668 (1985). 
129. It is not surprising that New York courts are the first to allow civil findings to be used preclu-
sively in disciplinary matters, given that the primary motivation for the rejection of this position is the 
courts' desire to safeguard their exclusive authority over attorneys. New York courts have been recog-
nized for their moderation in this tendency. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 2.2, at 25 (1986) ("New 
York courts, for a prominent and perhaps extreme example, have resisted exercising broad supervisory 
powers over lawyers beyond those conferred by legislation."). See also Feinstein v. Attorney Gen., 36 
N.Y.2d 199, 203, 326 N.E.2d 288, 290, 366 N.Y.S.2d 613, 616 (1975) ("If regulation or supervision 
beyond the limited powers of the Appellate Division are required, its provision lies with the 
Legislature."). 
With the adoption of new professional disciplinary rules, however, the New York appellate divisions 
have adopted an exception to the preclusive use of civil findings in disciplinary hearings. The new rules 
now hold as professional misconduct the unlawful discrimination in the practice of law "in hiring, 
promoting or otherwise determining conditions of employment, on the basis of age, race, creed, color, 
national origin, sex, disability, or marital status." LAWYER'S CODE, supra note 36, DR 1-102(A)(6). 
The rule mandates that complaints of discrimination against a lawyer be brought first in any available 
tribunal of competent jurisdiction, other than a disciplinary hearing, such as a state or federal court, or 
an EEOC hearing. Decisions of these tribunals, which find against the attorney, and after all appellate 
review has been exhausted, shall constitute prima facie evidence of professional misconduct in a disci-
plinary proceeding. Id. Thus, the appellate division discriminates against charges of discrimination 
since these findings, even if from a federal district court and affirmed by the United States Supreme 
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noted that collateral estoppel is a routinely used and codified aspect of the 
New York disciplinary process. 130 Based on these applications, the court 
announced, "We see no reason why the application of collateral estoppel to 
disciplinary proceedings should be limited to instances covered by the rule 
[N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 603 (providing for collateral 
estoppel effect of criminal convictions and foreign disciplinary 
determinations)]" .131 
Subsequent to the Cohn matter, the Departmental Disciplinary Commit-
tee of the First Department has petitioned the New York Supreme Court, 
Appellate Division, to invoke collateral estoppel for civil findings and, on at 
least three occasions, the motion was granted. 132 
VII. PROPOSED APPLICATION: ONE SMALL STEP FOR THE DISCIPLINARY 
PROCESS 
The proposed collateral estoppel rule would effect a significant but lim-
ited change in attorney disciplinary procedure. While adopting this propo-
Court, can only constitute rebuttable evidence rather than conclusive evidence. 
130. See N.Y. COMP. CooEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 603.3(a) (applying some preclusive effect to 
findings of misconduct by disciplinary authorities in foreign jurisdictions but subject to certain defenses 
enumerated in § 603 .3(c)); id. § 603.12 (applying preclusive effect to criminal conviction) . 
131 . In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 3. The court also distinguished In re Tanz, 233 A.D. 300, 
252 N.Y.S. 769 (I 931) on grounds that (a) the municipal court in that case was not a court of superior 
general jurisdiction, and (b) Tanz was decided at a time at which collateral estoppel was applied in a 
much more restrictive manner than presently. In re Cohn, No. M-5696, slip op. at 3. 
132. One of these cases is not yet in the public domain due to secrecy requirements. See N.Y. Juo. 
LAW§ 90(10) (McKinney 1983). This matter and In re Klein, infra, arc scheduled for a mitigation 
hearing to examine evidence arguing for lesser sanctions. See supra note 40 and accompanying text . 
The Klein matter is in the anomalous position of being confidential and nonconfidcntial at the same 
time. Access to the case comes as a result of Klein 's failure to seek confidentiality for his interim appeal 
to the New York Court of Appeals where the action is nonconfidcntial. The Court of Appeals rejected 
the motion for leave to appeal from the Appellate Division's invocation of collateral estoppel. Hence, 
the matter is still sub judice in the Appellate Division, where the action is still considered confidential. 
The two " public" matters, In re Klein, No. M-6508 (N .Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't), leave to appeal 
denied, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8571, motion/or leave to appeal dismissed, 76 N.Y.2d 936, 564 
N.E.2d 674, 563 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1990) (dismissing upon the ground that order of collateral estoppel was 
not a final determination), and In re Slater, 156 A.D.2d 89, 554 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1990), arise out of 
"disbarment" proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office of the Department of Commerce (PTO) . 
The PTO proceedings, which both involved charges of misrepresentation and neglect of client matters, 
arc arguably " foreign disciplinary proceedings." While a First Department rule provides for discipline 
based on professional misconduct in a foreign jurisdiction, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 
603.3(a), the rule limits the definition of foreign jurisdiction to "another state, territory or district." Id. 
Because the PTO docs not fit within the definition of a foreign jurisdiction, the Departmental Discipli-
nary Committee was forced to move for collateral estoppel based on the common-law doctrine of collat-
eral estoppel rather than the codification of collateral estoppel in section 603.3(a). See Departmental 
Disciplinary Committee Petition para. 3, Slater (No. M-5437). Thus, these PTO derived cases appear 
to be an exceptional form of reciprocal discipline that do not fit into the reciprocal discipline rule 
because of a technicality. 
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sal would seem to markedly increase attorney vulnerability to sanctions for 
misconduct, several factors work to mitigate the effect of this proposal. The 
principal limitation is that relatively few civil court proceedings involving 
lawyers would be eligible for preclusive effect. 
Most civil proceedings require that findings be made merely by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; the overwhelming majority of states require 
that disciplinary findings be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, 
the lower level of proof required in civil trials disqualifies most civil find-
ings from being used preclusively. 
Additionally, distinctions between civil fiduciary obligations and ethical 
requirements are germane. 133 Attorneys, as fiduciaries for their clients, 134 
are required to deal fairly with clients. 135 To ensure that an attorney meets 
this standard, courts often regard attorney-client transactions as presump-
tively void. 136 Thus, when an attorney-client transaction is called into ques-
tion and later examined in a civil trial, the attorney often bears the burden 
of coming forward to demonstrate that the transaction was fair and equita-
ble and that the client was fully informed as to all matters relating to the 
transaction. 137 Should the attorney fail to carry his burden, the court will 
find against him and strike down the agreement. 
Findings arising out of such proceedings are inappropriate for collateral 
estoppel effect to establish ethical violations. In disciplinary hearings, the 
disciplinary prosecutor always carries the burden of proving his charges, 
regardless of the standard required. Because the allocation of the burden 
can be outcome determinative, a civil proceeding putting the burden on the 
attorney should not give rise to a finding that may be asserted conclusively 
133. See Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of Den-
mark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 44 n.65 ( 1989). 
134. Los Angeles Airways, Inc. v. Davis 687 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1982); Hunniecutt v. State Bar, 
44 Cal. 3d 362, 372, 748 P.2d 1161, 1167, 243 Cal. Rptr. 699, 705 ( 1988); Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill . 
273, 277, 90 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1950); C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 4.1, at 145-48. 
135. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T)he duty of loyalty 
requires [a fiduciary] to demonstrate that any actions it does take are fair and reasonable."); Huston v. 
Schohr, 63 Cal. App. 2d 267, 275, 146 P.2d 730, 733 (1944) (the highest degree of good faith is 
required in all dealings between attorney and client). 
136. See I R. MALLEN & J. SMITH. LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.20, at 685 (3d ed. 1989). 
137. See Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal. App. 3d 251,262, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512,519 (1977) (attorney must 
show "by clear and satisfactory evidence" that transaction was fair and that the client was fully in-
formed); Gordon v. Bialystoker Center & Bikur Cholim, Inc., 45 N .Y.2d 692, 698-99, 385 N.E.2d 285, 
288-89, 412 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596-97 (1978) (fiduciary must "show affirmatively that no deception was 
practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary and well understood" 
(quoting Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99-100 (1878)). This policy especially is strong where courts 
examine testamentary clauses naming attorney draftsmen as beneficiaries. See In re Putnam's Will, 257 
N.Y. 140, 143, 177 N.E. 399, 400 (1931) ("The law . ... requires the lawyer who drafts himself a 
bequest to explain the circumstances and to show in the first instance that the gift was freely and 
willingly made."). Cf C. WOLFRAM, supra note 4, § 8.12.2, at 486 (" Anglo-American law has always 
been wary of the power that can be exercised over a donor by a close and trusted legal adviser.") . 
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in a subsequent disciplinary hearing where the burden is on the disciplinary 
prosecutor. 138 
Finally, when examining the actions of an attorney, courts often label 
the attorney's acts "fraudulent" if the attorney is found to have breached 
his fiduciary obligation to his client. While the term "fraud" is used with 
some frequency in the judicial literature, care is sometimes not taken to 
indicate whether actual fraud or constructive fraud is intended. 139 Actual 
fraud requires that there be a false representation of a material fact and a 
present intention to deceive. 140 Constructive fraud occurs when, in the 
course of a fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary takes advantage of his cli-
ent by using his superior knowledge, or an overmastering influence, or the 
trust and confidence reposed in him, to his benefit at the client's expense. 141 
Because constructive fraud is not itself a sufficient condition for a finding 
of misconduct in an ethical context, these findings of "fraudulent" acts are 
not sufficient to preclusively make a misconduct finding. 
By way of illustration, consider the following examples. 
An attorney and partner are appointed coexecutors in a will drawn by 
one of the attorneys in a jurisdiction where a statutory provision allows co-
executors of estates above a specified size to each receive a full statutory 
commission. 142 When testators have made such appointments, courts have 
found the attorneys to have committed constructive fraud. 143 As a result of 
138. See FRIEDENTHAL. KANE & MILLER, supra note 7, at 664-65. 
139. See, e.g., In re Vilkomerson, 270 A.D. 166, 58 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1945) (though labelling attor-
ney's conduct simply "fraud," attorney action constituted only constructive fraud), appeal dismissed, 
296 N.Y. 770, 70 N.E.2d 747 (1946); In re Will of Hollenbeck, 65 Misc. 2d 796, 800, 318 N.Y.S.2d 
604, 609 (Sur. Ct. 1969) (no evidence of fraud or undue inOucnce), ajfd, 37 A.D.2d 922, 325 
N. Y .S.2d 736 ( I 971 ). This ambiguity may well result from older usages which predate the use of the 
term "constructive fraud." Thus, in In re Will of Smith, 95 N.Y. 516 (1884), a lawyer drew a will 
which made himself the chief beneficiary of the testator who died five days later. In reversing the 
admission of the will to probate, the Court of Appeals found "[u)ndue inOucncc, which is a species of 
fraud . ... " Id. at 522. In modern usage, the opinion would have used the term "constructive fraud" 
instead of "fraud." This is demonstrated by the court's statement a few lines later that "[t]ransactions 
between guardian and ward, attorney and client, trustee and cestui que trust, or persons one of whom is 
dependent upon and subject to the control of the other, arc illustrations of this doctrine." Id. The court 
was, of course, indicating the now familiar categories of fiduciary relationships and the "fraud" it spoke 
of was a violation of a fiduciary obligation which is now denominated as "constructive fraud." 
140. Trenga Realty v. Tiseo, I 17 A.D.2d 95 I, 952, 499 N.Y.S.2d 262, 264 (1986); Lanzi v. Brooks, 
54 A.D.2d 1057, 1058, 388 N.Y.S.2d 946, 947-48 (1976), ajfd, 43 N.Y.2d 778, 373 N.E.2d 278, 402 
N.Y.S.2d 384 (1977). 
141. Cowee v. Cornell, 75 N.Y. 91, 99-100 (1878); Gordon v. Bialystokcr Center & Bikur Cholim, 
Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 692, 698-99, 385 N.E.2d 285, 288-89, 412 N.Y.S.2d 593, 597 (1978). 
142. See, e.g., N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 2307(5) (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1991) (al-
lowing full commission to more than one fiduciary in certain instances). 
143. See Katz v. Usdan (In re Estate of Weinstock), 40 N.Y.2d I, 6-7, 351 N.E.2d 647, 649, 386 
N. Y .S.2d I, 3 (1976) (reversing Appellate Division order on grounds that such action constituted con-
structive fraud). Constructive fraud occurs when an attorney fiduciary takes advantage of the client by 
using superior knowledge, or an overmastering inOucncc, or the trust and confidence reposed in him to 
30 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 5:1 
this constructive fraud, the attorneys' commissions may be denied 144 or 
reduced. 145 
Such a finding and reduction, however, would not satisfy the require-
ments for estoppel effect in a subsequent disciplinary hearing charging the 
attorney with a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) (conduct constituting dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation). Violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) re-
quires intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 146 Since courts have indi-
cated that such dual executors are guilty of constructive fraud and face 
commission reductions even where there is no intent to deceive, 147 these 
findings do not supply the necessary prerequisites to finding a violation of 
DR 1-102(A)(4). 148 
Consider further that the appointment of the partner as coexecutor 
arises out of admiration by the client for the partner who, like the elderly 
client, emigrated to the United States in a penurious state and, by dint of 
mind and effort, attended law school and succeeded to the American 
dream. The lawyer, already appointed as executor of this sizeable estate in 
a previous will he drafted, explains to the client that appointment of his 
partner ·as coexecutor would result in charging the estate for two full com-
missions.149 The lawyer does not explain to the client that her admiration 
for his partner can be manifested by appointing the partner as an alternate 
the attorney's advantage and the client's detriment. Cowee, 75 N.Y. at 99-100; Gordon, 45 N.Y.2d at 
698-99, 385 N.E.2d at 288-89, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 597. The benefit to the attorneys at the client's ex-
pense arises in the payment of double commissions for what amounts to a single executor's perform-
ance. Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d at 6 n.•, 351 N.E.2d at 649 n.•, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 3 n.• . 
144. See, e.g., Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d at I, 351 N.E.2d at 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d at I. 
145. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thron, 139 Misc. 2d 1045, 1050-51, 530 N.Y.S.2d 951,955 (Sur. Ct. 
1988). 
146. See ln•re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 923 (D.C. I 987) ("In the absence of affirmative proof of a 
fraudulent intent or state of mind . .. [respondent's) misdemeanor conviction did not establish a viola-
tion of DR 1-102(A)(4)."); In re Oliver, 142 A.D.2d 831,834,530 N.Y.S.2d 890,892 (1988) (credible 
testimony belying intent to defraud or mislead warranted rejecting a violation of DR l-l02(A)(4)). 
" 'Fraud' docs not include conduct, although characterized as fraudulent . . . which lacks an element 
of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, , or knowing failure to correct misrepresentations which can be 
reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance by another." LAWYER'S CODE. supra note 36, Dcfi· 
nitions. But see In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507,527,548 N.E.2d 1051, 1059 (1989) (intent to defraud or 
to deceive is not an clement of DR l-102(A)(4) violation); R. ROTUNDA, supra note 93, at 20 (viola• 
tions of fiduciary obligation are disciplinable under DR 1-102(A)(4)). 
147. For example, in In re Estate of Thron, 139 Misc. 2d 1045, 530 N.Y.S.2d 951 (Sur. Ct. 1988), 
the court found constructive fraud, see 139 Misc. 2d at 1048, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 954, reduced the com-
missions due the executors although there was no evidence that the attorneys actively induced the 
testator to name both executors, see 139 Misc. 2d at 1050, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 955, and noted that instead 
the dual appointment could be attributed to the attorneys' ignorance of the applicable law. Id. 
148. Of course this does not rule out that the possibility that the attorneys' actions in obtaining the 
coexccutor appointment could have involved a violation of DR l-l02(A)(4). Rather, the civil findings 
do not conclusively establish a disciplinary violation. Thus, the respondent should be given the opportu-
nity to litigate the question of the violation in the disciplinary hearing. 
149. Supra note 142. 
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or successor executor rather than coexecutor-thus saving a full commis-
sion. Failure to so disclose results in a benefit to the lawyer at the client's 
expense and therefore breaches the lawyer's fiduciary obligation. 150 If a 
court were to invalidate that testamentary provision on the grounds of over-
reaching and constructive fraud, those findings would not constitute a vio-
lation of a disciplinary regulation. They would not, for example, constitute 
a violation of DR 5-I0I(A) because, having explained to the client that 
there would be double commissions, the lawyer has fulfilled the mandate of 
DR 5-I0I(A) that, in the event of a conflict of interest, the lawyer explain 
the conflict to the client and proceed with the representation only if and 
after the client assents. 151 Hence, the invalidation of the testamentary pro-
vision on the ·grounds stated would not be the basis for invocation of collat-
eral estoppel in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding. 
Consider further a lawyer152 specializing in pension law who receives a 
telephone cali from a close friend, also a lawyer, who informs him that, 
based on public information, he believes that a tender offer is imminent for 
a publicly held corporation and urges him to buy the shares and split any 
profits. The lawyer immediately purchases call options and also informs 
another friend. The other frierid does not act upon the information because 
he receives it after trading had been suspended due to announcement of the 
takeover. The lawyer is investigated by the SEC and learns that the infor-
mation he received was indeed nonpublic information and enters into a 
consent order with the SEC to surrender his profits. A year later he is 
convicted in federal district court of criminal violation of the securities 
laws. The regulation violated makes unlawful the communication of "mate-
rial non-public information relating to a tender offer to any other person 
under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable" that the other 
person will purchase or sell securities in the company which is the subject 
of the tender offer. 153 Thus, the criminal case was not based on the lawyer's 
personal trading but on his communication to the other friend. The punish-
ment m_eted out was under that part of the statute which permits only a 
fine when the defendant proves that he had no knowledge of the regulation 
he was violating. 154 
150. See New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. No. 569 ( 1985) 
(lawyer should advise a client of the feasibility of settling a "small estate" without the expense of legal 
representation); New York County Bar Ass'n Op. No. 371 (1945) (client seeking advice regarding 
Selective Service matter must be informed that free assistance is available from advisory board created 
under Selective Service regulations), discussed in H. DRINKER. LEGAL ETHICS 103 (1953) . 
15 I. There are other reasons why the fact situation does not portray a violation of DR 5- IO I (A). For 
example, there is no conflict of interest. See Brickman, supra note 133, at 48-49. 
152. The facts in this example are suggested by In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987). 
153. 17 C.F.R. §240.14e-3(d) (1990); Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 921. 
154. 15 U.S.C. §78ff(a) (1988); Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 921-22. 
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Since the criminal conviction did not require any showing of intent-in 
fact, a negligent communication was sufficient and, since the record shows 
that the lawyer did not know that his communication to his friend was 
unlawful-then, DR 1-102(A)(4) has not been violated. Indeed, on the ba-
sis of the facts related, no disciplinary regulation has been violated 155 and, 
accordingly, collateral estoppel cannot be invoked. 
Now consider a successful civil suit alleging common-law fraud on the · 
part of an attorney. The attorney is an owner-manager of a closely held 
company. In order to persuade other shareholders (not active in the busi-
ness) to sell their shares to the attorney, he represents that the company is 
faring poorly and is unlikely to pay out dividends. In actuality, the com-
pany is prospering and exhibits a growing earning capability. The trial 
court, requiring a clear and convincing showing of evidence by the plaintiff, 
finds active misrepresentation by the attorney and finds the attorney liable. 
The attorney exhausts all appeals, each upholding the trial court's 
findings. 156 
These facts constitute a compelling argument for adoption of this arti-
cle's proposal. The evidentiary standard in the civil suit fulfills the require-
ments in a subsequent disciplinary case in all states except Georgia. 157 The 
exhaustion of appeals without reversal indicates that the civil proceeding 
offered a full and fair opportunity on the issue, actual fraud (as opposed to 
constructive), that is decisive in the subsequent disciplinary hearing. 158 Un-
less the attorney demonstrates an infirmity in the civil judgment or shows 
that estoppel will result in unfairness, the attorney, under our proposal, will 
be precluded from contesting a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). The attorney 
would, however, be permitted to present evidence mitigating the signifi-
cance of the violation and arguing for a lesser sanction. 
In these circumstances, the attorney has had a full and fair opportunity 
to contest the charges and, at the same time, the courts have conserved 
judicial resources. Additionally, preclusion ensures that the public is not 
faced with inconsistent judgements upon the same facts. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Findings of civil courts should be given preclusive effect in subsequent 
155. Hutchinson, 534 A.2d at 923. 
156. These facts are suggested by Holdsworth v. Strong, No. C-190-73 (D. Utah Dec. 21, 1974), 
affd, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). The Court's determination led 
to disciplinary proceedings by the Utah Bar Commission and an appeal therefrom. See In re Strong, 
616 P.2d 583 (Utah 1980)). 
· 157. See Law. Man., supra note 13, at 101:2102 to 2104. 
158. The prior litigation is conclusive as to the violation. The sanction warranted must be deter-
mined by the disciplinary authorities and ultimately the state supreme court. 
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disciplinary hearings subject to the same rules of collateral estoppel used 
for the transfer of factual findings between courts. Adoption of our propo-
sal would require that civil trial courts, sitting in matters where attorneys 
are defendants or where an attorney's actions are the subject of the litiga-
tion, take special care to clearly express their findings regarding the attor-
ney's actions. In particular, if they find inappropriate behavior, the court 
should unequivocally state whether or not there was intent of the type re-
quired for a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4) or Moqel Rule 8.4(c). Doing so 
under a regime of collateral estoppel would conserve judicial resources. 
Those courts rejecting collateral estoppel for civil findings are promul-
gating a special rule that aggrandizes the position of attorneys by granting 
them the advantage of relitigating issues previously litigated and decided 
adversely to attorneys. The second opportunity granted lawyers by these 
courts is an opportunity without basis in rules of procedure and beyond the 
needs of the court to effectuate their power to regulate the practice of law. 
The opportunity not only conflicts with court policy adopted toward crimi-
nal and foreign disciplinary findings but also does not square with analysis 
under the Park/ane paradigm for evaluating the appropriateness of the as-
sertion of collateral estoppel. This privilege exempts attorneys from the 
burdens of collateral estoppel in circumstances where other professionals 
and laymen must shoulder this imposition to further the goals of consistent, 
efficient and nonduplicative litigation. The attorney's ability to relitigate 
prior civil findings in disciplinary procedures sacrifices these goals that 
courts otherwise seek. The cost of this privilege is absorbed by the judicial 
system and thus imposed on all of society while the benefit accrues only to 
lawyers. Courts are well advised to follow the as yet silent lead of New 
York's Appellate Division, First Department, and make the findings of civil 
courts eligible for preclusive effect in attorney disciplinary hearings. 
